UNDERSTANDING STATE RACISM

Izeth Hussain

The greatest enemy of the Sinhalese is not the Tamil or the Muslim or the Indian or the Westerner. The greatest enemy of the Sinhalese is the Sinhalese State racist. As I explained in my article Reflections on State Racism in The Island of October 12 the Sinhalese State racist has his hands on the levers of State power, and he can deploy State power together with his associates both within and outside the network of the State. Because of the enormous State power that he can wield, he is an infinitely more noxious creature than the average Sinhalese racist. His ostensible enemies are the Tamils, the Muslims, the Indians and the Westerners. But he has harmed the Sinhalese most of all. And, unless he is stopped from proceeding merrily with his further depredations, he can even bring about the break-up of Sri Lanka.

It is therefore crucially important to have a proper understanding of the phenomenon of State racism. In order to counter a peril facing the nation, we have in the first place to identify that peril and have a proper understanding of what it's all about. This seems to me particularly important at the present juncture. At long last, after so many decades, there are hopes, faint hopes or foolish hopes may be, but hopes all the same, that we may be able, not to solve the ethnic problem straightaway, but at least make a beginning to move towards a solution through pragmatic Sinhalese-Tamil accommodation. I have in mind, of course, the potential in the Northern Provincial Council for that accommodation. The strategy followed for almost four years since 2009 of heavy infrastructure expenditure plus militarisation of the North and other stupidities has been a complete flop, as shown by the NPC elections. On the other hand addressing the people's needs at the grass roots level through the NPC, on the basis of Sinhalese-Tamil flexibility and co-operation, could conceivably lead to very positive developments. In this situation, we can expect the State racists to go all out to sabotage the NPC. And in this situation a proper understanding of the phenomenon of State racism becomes particularly important.

But before sketching out that understanding, I must make some observations on the State racist's record of anti-national depredation. He, above all, is responsible for the deaths of around 100,000 Sri Lankans – perhaps the number is much more if we give credence to the charge that around 40,000 were wantonly killed at the concluding stage of the war. That figure of 100,000 includes scores of thousands of Sinhalese. They died because the State racists' intransigent opposition to every move towards accommodation with the Tamils on the basis of devolution, however modest the extent of devolution might be. For instance, the elections to the District Development Councils of 1981 were rendered farcical by the State racists, and so was the functioning of the DDCs thereafter. That intransigence had behind it an insensate drive towards majoritarian domination over the minorities.

After 1977 there was a qualitative difference in State racist action: it turned violent. In earlier articles I have covered State terrorism against the Tamils from 1977 to 1983. Sinhalese mass participation in that terrorism was conspicuous by its absence, except for a few brief hours on Black Friday of July '83. The State terrorism of that period was an affair of the Sinhalese State racists, backed by JRJ and other leaders. Instead of going into details about what happened in July '83, I will focus on just one significant detail: the Tamils were treated worse than animals. I am not waxing rhetorical here: I am being soberly factual and literal. My point is that since British times pariah dogs were rounded up in the streets of Colombo and put to sleep. They had never been burnt alive, which became the fate of many Tamils in July '83.

The aftermath of July '83 was also horrifying, beginning with JRJ's notorious broadcast to the nation which shocked the world by virtually justifying the horrors perpetrated against the Tamils. There was a mournful silence from the civil society until – I am told – it was broken by the journalist Anne Abeyesekera with a letter to the newspaper, The Sun. There followed the admirable Pastoral Letter of Bishop Lakshman Wickremasinghe, some outspoken writings of high quality by Gananath Obeysekera and others, and a masterpiece in the form of a small book by Dick Hensman writing under the name of L. Piyadasa. There was not much else worthy of note. There was a virtual non-reaction from our politicians, both on the Government and Opposition sides, in horrifying contrast to reactions after the 1958 riots. The point on which I want to insist is that our Tamils had no one to turn to within Sri Lanka. It was that situation that drove our Tamils to take to arms, and India to provide weapons and training. It is true that the war that followed was unconscionably prolonged because of the intransigence of the LTTE. The important point, however, is that the war was got going by the intransigence over many decades of the Sinhalese State racist who would not countenance even a modest measure of devolution which could well have ended the ethnic problem decades ago. Therefore the primary responsibility for the deaths of scores of thousands of Sinhalese rests with the State racist. On that record the Sinhalese State racist has to be recognized as the greatest enemy of the Sinhalese people.

I have written above that in his further depredations the State racist can bring about the break-up of Sri Lanka. It is a remote contingency, a worst-case hypothesis which – because of its gravity – we should always bear in mind. As I have written about it before, I will here emphasize just one point. The international community will regard India's concern about the treatment of Tamils in Sri Lanka as entirely legitimate, and it will so regard also – under certain circumstances – Indian intervention to break up Sri Lanka. The crucial point is that internal developments can have a serious fall-out in another country. The most convincing analogy that I can think of is the nuclear reactor in Tamil Nadu, which in case of its malfunctioning can have lethal consequences in Sri Lanka. Likewise serious maltreatment of our Tamils can cause serious concerns in Tamil Nadu of a sort that New Delhi might see as even posing a threat to India's unity, and that might be seen as providing legitimate cause for intervention in Sri Lanka.

A further case for stopping the depredations of the State racist arises out of the fact that Sri Lanka has a rather poor international image these days. It is not isolated internationally but it is deeply alienated from a powerful segment of the globe, the West, and its relationship with India is fraught with much uncertainty. There are several reasons for this poor image. Its record in dealing with the Tamil ethnic problem during the last four years has been disgraceful. It has a very questionable record on human rights. It has been moving steadily in a dangerous anti-democratic and neo-Fascist direction. The recent anti-Muslim campaign, which clearly had State backing to a seriously incriminating extent, has caused – we can be sure - almost universal disgust. Above all, there is the ongoing unrelenting campaign on the charge that around 40,000 civilians were massacred at the concluding stages of the war. Sri Lanka looks vulnerable, and could well become the object of international punitive action, not excluding even UN sanctions.

We must now take effective action to stop the depredations of the State racist, and for this purpose – as I have argued in the second paragraph of this article – we need a proper understanding of the phenomenon of State racism: to counter a peril we need to know what the peril is about. In my article of October 12 I explained what State racism has meant in practice in Sri Lanka. Racists who could get their hands on to the levers of State power, together with their associates, have exercised inordinate power over our ethnic problems. Their power has been inordinate because they don't have much support among the Sinhalese people, as shown by the fact that at the recent Provincial Council elections they could not win even a single seat. But they have had the support of very powerful personages at the apex of the State. It has been a peculiarity of Sri Lankan ethnopolitics that the Centre has too often been close to the lunatic fringe.

What the Sri Lankan case shows is that power can be exercised not only by Governments and those who hold legitimate power, but also by small groups who have no representative status and no legitimacy at all, and the power of the latter can sometimes be much greater than that of the legitimate holders of power. This is the case even in a long-established democracy such as that of the US. Way back in the 'fifties of the last century Eisenhower spoke about the power of the "military-industrial complex", and in recent times we have been hearing much about the power of the Zionist lobby, which is said to be far more powerful than the American people. Reading Christopher Hitchens' book, The Trial of Henry Kissinger, some weeks ago I was struck by the extent of the power wielded in the US outside the purview of the Government. The American Ambassador in Chile could as the representative of his Government wine and dine a Chilean politician who had been marked out by the CIA – functioning outside the purview of that Government – for assassination.

It is possible that after CHOGM is over, there might be intensive action against the Northern Provincial Council and the devolutionary approach to the Tamil ethnic problem, and perhaps also a revival of the anti-Muslim campaign in all its earlier fury. The kind of counter-action to be taken will have to depend on the circumstances prevailing at the time. But the guiding principle for counter-action is clear: it should focus not on the Sinhalese people but on their enemy, the Sinhalese State racist. I will provide a concrete example of what I have in mind. If there is a revival of anti-Muslim action and the police again play the role of passive spectators, the counter-action should not focus on the alleged anti-Muslim racism of the Sinhalese people: it should focus on the State racist who commanded that police inaction. More specifically, the counter-action should focus on making the President take corrective action, getting the police to play their usual role of maintaining law and order.

Izeth Hussain, Understanding State Racism, The Island, Colombo, 2013-10-18.