THE ETHNIC IMBROGLIO CONTINUES

Izeth Hussain

The French have a saying that goes, "The more it changes, the more it’s the same thing". I wrote an article many years ago characterizing our Sinhalese-Tamil ethnic problem as an imbroglio, having in mind the fact that the same problem was going on and on while the apparent changes were only of a superficial order. The term "imbroglio" has been in fairly wide usage in recent years, obviously because it is apposite for a problem that remains unchanged whatever other changes take place. The enormous change of a war, a thirty –year war, took place, followed by the even more enormous change of a decisive and definitive defeat for the LTTE, which led to sanguine expectations of an early solution to the ethnic problem. But it continues all the same.

However it is a fact – which is surely well attested by History – that change also takes place. The following question arises: How do we bring about a change in the ethnic problem? The dictionary definition of the term "imbroglio" could help at this point. It means "a confused heap; complicated (especially political or dramatic) situation". This suggests that a problem continues without change and without a solution because it has been too confusing to be understood with all its complications. It suggests further that the way to approach an imbroglio is to try to get at the fundamentals underlying all the confusion and the complications.

At this point we have to face up to a problem. My fundamentals may not be your fundamentals, and what are recognized by the Tamils as fundamentals, as givens not requiring any arguments, may not be recognized at all as fundamentals by the Sinhalese. The following question arises: who is to act as judge or arbiter in deciding what constitute the fundamentals of the ethnic problem? As this is not a philosophical question but one pertaining to the realm of practical politics, our answer has to be a practical one. My answer is that the international community has to act as judge or arbiter. At this point some readers may emit a howl of rage and, while still in a sitting posture, voluntarily rise three feet in the air as Wodehouse might have put it. Surely everyone who is not an utter nitwit knows full well that the so-called "international community" is just euphemism for a gang of powerful countries led mostly by crooks and thugs who specialize in double standards. But there is also another valid usage of the term "international community". It refers to the totality of the membership of the United Nations, the member states who are committed by virtue of that membership to the norms and values set out in the UN Charter, and also the Declarations and legally binding Covenants on Human Rights. The most important fact for our purpose is that in the decades following the establishment of the UN the international community has been placing more and more value on human rights and democracy. Our fundamentals will therefore be judged by their approximation or otherwise to the norms of human rights and democracy.

I come now to the fundamentals of the ethnic problem as seen by our Tamils. They claim to be just as indigenous to the national territory of Sri Lanka as the Sinhalese, having been here as long or even longer. They had a Jaffna kingdom for centuries, and in any case they have a well-established area of traditional habitation in the North-East. They therefore have a homeland, on which basis they claim to be a national minority and not just another minority like the SL Muslims. On that basis they claim the right to self-determination that is enshrined in the UN Charter and other legal instruments of the UN. The right to self-determination is taken as meaning that they have an inalienable right to set up a separate state, or failing that to a wide measure of autonomy in accordance with the principle of internal self-determination. Autonomy, which becomes possible through devolution of power, is consistent with the essential trend of modern democracy which is to bring government to the grass roots level of the people.

There is nothing new-fangled about those Tamil fundamentals which have held sway over the Tamil mind for many decades, long antedating the Vaddukoddai Resolution of 1975; nor is there the slightest prospect of their changing. That was made quite apparent by the overwhelming victory of the TNA at the recent Northern Provincial Council elections. During the election campaign period there was a screeching hysteria, not only among the hardliners but also in the mainstream media, over indications that the TNA still regarded Prabhakaran as a hero and was still hankering for Eelam. All that left the Tamil people unfazed, because they remained dedicated, along with the TNA, to the principle of either devolution or outright separation. The elections showed also that the economic strategy on which the Government has depended for four years to appease the Tamils – the strategy of massive expenditure on infrastructure – has been a complete flop. The Tamils remain dedicated to the fundamentals that I have stated above, which really amount to an absolute on which no compromise is possible. The absolute is this: the Tamils want joint rule, and will never be satisfied with Sinhalese rule over the Tamils.

There is a wide and firmly established consensus, even a near unanimity, among the Tamils about the fundamentals of the ethnic problem, but among the Sinhalese there is and there has always been serious schism about the fundamentals. According to the prevailing orthodoxy, all the historical claims of the Tamils are tosh and there is no valid basis for self-determination and devolution. Furthermore the Sinhalese people – according to the orthodoxy – have never accepted and will never accept devolution because they know that sooner or later it will lead to a separate state. This notion is factually incorrect because there is evidence showing that the Sinhalese people have in the past been prepared to accept a wide measure of devolution.

However, I am prepared to acknowledge that at the present stage – whatever may have been the case in the past – suspicions about the possible ill consequences of devolution are widespread among the Sinhalese people. Some would hold that even a modest amount of devolution would lead ineluctably by a linear progression to a separate state. Others would hold that devolution could conceivably set off unforeseeable processes that might lead to separation or something close to it. Either way, it appears that the Sinhalese consensus would be prepared to allow only a very modest measure of devolution – not 13A + but 13A -, without land and police powers. There is therefore a stark dichotomy in the Sinhalese and Tamil understanding of the fundamentals of the ethnic problem: the Tamils claim the right to a very wide measure of devolution or even separation, while the Sinhalese could be prepared to allow only a very modest extent of devolution that will never satisfy the Tamils.

On that reading we have to expect the ethnic imbroglio to continue. How do we get out of the imbroglio? I believe that the only way is to show that the Sinhalese fears about the possible ill consequences of devolution are entirely unfounded. I have in mind a simple and straightforward argument that I believe cannot be controverted. A country can break up only for one of two possible reasons: either a government is willing to allow it, or cannot prevent it. Eritrea, East Timor, and South Sudan became separate states because the Governments of Ethiopia, Indonesia, and Sudan were willing to allow that outcome, behind which was probably the recognition that they never had a legitimate claim to those territories. Kosovo became a separate state because the Serbs, not being able to withstand NATO power, could not prevent it. In the case of Sri Lanka, it is impossible to envisage any Government being willing to relinquish sovereignty over the North-East on the ground that we never had a legitimate claim to that territory. Sri Lanka can break up only because of inability to withstand an external force. The important point is that devolution will never by itself lead to the breakup of Sri Lanka.

At this point I must pose a very commomnsensical question: if devolution will lead to separation or promote it, why was Prabhakaran so adamantly opposed to it? Obviously he was convinced that devolution would prevent separation, not lead to it. And behind that conviction he very probably had in mind the pragmatic experience of India in preventing its breakup. Historically India never was a single political unit, not even under British rule because during that time about a third of Indian territory was under the Maharajas. India was fully unified only after 1947, and the single most important instrument in preserving that unity – a mighty achievement – was devolution. That was why India imposed 13A on us: devolution here too seemed the best way of preserving unity.

I have stated above that Sri Lanka can break up only because of our inability to withstand an external force. I have written more than one article in the past on the possibility – only as a worst case hypothesis – that India might impose a Cyprus-style solution on Sri Lankan. The late H.L. de Silva wrote some months before he passed away that initially he had found my arguments to be rather fanciful, but later he came to take them seriously. I will not recapitulate those arguments. Instead I will now make a point of the highest importance: India has to be regarded as an integral part of our ethnic problem, indeed as one of its fundamentals. If not for India’s interest in our Tamils – a perfectly legitimate interest it must be said – the rest of the world would hardly notice them. Our Government would have been free to treat them simply as a conquered people without their being any unwelcome repercussions.

I believe that Indian intervention in Sri Lanka might take place only under two conditions. One is that ill treatment of Tamils here causes very serious reactions in Tamil Nadu – such as for instance the formation of separatist movements. We have to bear in mind the changing international situation and their possible impact on Sri Lanka, about which we can never be quite certain. I have in mind for instance the possible deleterious impact on Indo-Sri Lankan relations of the growing Chinese presence here. Any way the principle is this: the first condition for intervention is that India comes to believe that its vital and primordial interests are being threatened by the ill-treatment of Tamils here. The second condition is that, not just Tamil Nadu, but the international community comes to believe that the treatment of our Tamils is morally outrageous and intolerable. As I have pointed out earlier in this article, the treatment of our Tamils will be judged by its approximation or otherwise to the norms of human rights and democracy. I doubt that India will intervene in Sri Lanka unless it believes that it has the broad backing of the international community.

Is there any way out of the ethnic imbroglio? There could be if we conceptualize a political solution as emerging from an organic process of growth rather than through legislation and the putting in place of certain institutions. I have in mind the opportunities that might be offered by the Northern Provincial Council. 13A is certainly far from what the Tamils desire, but much can be done for the Tamils within its ambit, even in its presently truncated form without police and land powers. Suppose the TNA makes a success of the NPC? It could come to be emulated by the other PCs which up to now have been largely useless institutions. But for the success of the NPC the Government’s co-operation will be required, and – above all – the racists and the neo-Fascists will have to be kept in check, as they will find the idea of any Tamil success unbearable.
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         Izeth Hussain, The Ethnic Imbroglio, The Island, Colombo, 2013-09-28.